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Many workers’ rights, including the right to freedom of association 
at the workplace and the right to bargain collectively with employers, 
are recognized in international human rights agreements, including the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United 
Nations 1948; 1966). Many, if not all, workers’ rights recognized in 
international human rights law were preceded by the passage of Con-
ventions or Recommendations by the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) on the same subjects (ILO 2003, p. 2). The ILO’s Declara-
tion of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work requires all ILO 
member states to “respect, to promote, and to realize in good faith” five 
core rights, which are considered fundamental human rights. They are 
1) freedom of association, 2) the right to collective bargaining, 3) the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, 4) the effective 
abolition of child labor, and 5) the elimination of discrimination in re-
spect to employment or occupation (ILO n.d.).
In the United States, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
representation election is the primary means by which private sector 
workers exercise their rights to choose to be represented by a union. 
Because the “win rate” for unions in NLRB elections has declined over 
the past 50 years, and because increasingly smaller percentages of em-
ployees voting in these representation elections select unionization, 
observers have raised questions about the fairness and the conduct of 
these elections. Implicit standards for the conduct of democratic elec-
tions have existed for a long time. It is only since the end of the cold 
war, however, that international organizations have developed explicit 
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best practices that can be directly applied to evaluating the fairness of 
NLRB representation elections. 
This chapter argues that the new international standards for national 
political elections prove that NLRB representation elections, as cur-
rently implemented, are not free or fair. The lack of free and fair NLRB 
representation elections deprives workers of their rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining at the workplace.
THE NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTION PROCESS
The basic procedure U.S. workers must use to exercise their right 
to freedom of association is found in the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). The procedural details have been filled in through the admin-
istrative regulations issued by the NLRB. 
The process usually starts, however, outside the structures of the 
NLRA. The workers in a facility talk among themselves and decide that 
they would be better off if they joined a union. In most cases, workers 
call a local union office for help. If the workers can find a union that has 
an organizer available, the union will usually agree to send an organizer 
to meet with some of the workers. If, after talking with the initiating 
workers, the organizer believes that the prospects for a successful or-
ganizing drive are good, the union may agree to help organize workers. 
The following steps outline a typical process for organizing a union:
 1) Meetings are held before or after work, usually at a worker’s 
home, to discuss the benefits of forming a union and the strat-
egy and tactics of organizing.
 2) The union organizer and committed workers distribute cards to 
other workers to sign if they are interested in joining a union.
 3) After at least 30 percent of workers in a bargaining unit sign 
the cards, workers can petition the NLRB to hold a secret ballot 
election. In modern practice, union organizers usually collect 
cards from 60 to 70 percent of the workers in the bargaining 
unit before proceeding to the next step (Compa 2000). At this 
point, the employer can choose to recognize the union without 
proceeding further. 
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 4) If voluntary recognition does not occur, there is a four- to 
eight-week-long election campaign. During this preelection 
period there is vigorous campaigning on both sides (Roomkin 
and Block 1981). 
 5) NLRB agents conduct a secret ballot election at the workplace, 
allowing all workers to vote during work time. In the past sev-
eral years, workers have chosen union representation in about 
half of all elections held (Compa 2000). However, in the past 
few years, only about 20 percent of workers who have joined 
unions have done so as a result of the election process (Swee-
ney 2003). 
 6) Either party may file an objection to the election with the 
NLRB, claiming unfair practices by the other side. 
 7) If the NLRB certifies the election as fair and finds that a ma-
jority of those casting ballots prefer union representation, the 
employer is required by law to recognize the union and to col-
lectively bargain with workers over the terms and conditions 
of their work “in good faith.”
There is nothing inherently undemocratic about these steps. Having 
an election campaign to inform voters and using a secret ballot election 
to determine whether workers freely choose to join a union seems, on 
the surface, fair. Over the years, however, there have been numerous 
disputes between unions and management over the details of the imple-
mentation of the preelection, election campaign, and postelection rules. 
When adjudicating these disputes, the federal courts and the NLRB 
have given greater weight to the private property and free speech rights 
of employers than they have to the rights of free speech, freedom of as-
sociation, and collective bargaining for workers. The cumulative effect 
of these rulings has been to change the rules, allowing management in-
creasingly greater influence over the process by which workers choose 
to join a union (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996; Gross 1999). 
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ARE THE NLRB ELECTION PROCEDURES DEMOCRATIC?
Scholars have used a variety of approaches to demonstrate that 
NLRB representation election procedures are not democratic:
 1) summarizing the testimony of workers concerning the dis-
crimination they have faced when attempting to form a labor 
union (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996; Bronfenbrenner 1998; 
Compa 2000); 
 2) comparing NLRB representation elections with U.S. election 
procedures (Becker 1998; Levin 2001; Weiler 1997) and with 
ILO standards (Adams 2001; Compa 2000); 
 3) linking changes in representation election rules to higher win 
rates for the antiunion party (Block and Wolkinson 1985; 
Roomkin and Block 1981); and
 4) presenting survey results showing a high unmet demand for 
unionization (Freeman and Rogers 1999). 
Testimony before the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations in 1993 
indicated that many workers felt that it has become increasingly dif-
ficult to form unions using NLRB representation election procedures 
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). The workplace, which is the princi-
pal location of the election campaign, is not a neutral forum where the 
costs and benefits of unionization are discussed openly and freely. In-
stead, employers have a near-monopoly over access to voters. Employ-
ers have learned how to use procedures under the NLRA to delay the 
election, thus extending the time in which they can use their campaign 
advantage. Weak penalties for unfair labor practices under the NLRA 
encourage employers to push their advantage to the boundary of pos-
sible permissibility. Long delays in NLRB adjudication of cases of un-
fair labor practices against employers mean that the penalties, when 
administered, are usually hollow victories for workers (Block, Beck, 
and Kruger 1996). 
Many have claimed that U.S. national political elections would be 
widely condemned as unfair if they were run like NLRB representa-
tion elections (Becker 1998; Levin 2001; Sweeney 2003; Weiler 1997). 
There are, however, no explicit U.S. federal election rules of procedure 
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that provide best practices for conducting elections. The U.S. Constitu-
tion and election laws let individual states decide on most of the details 
of election procedure. Thus, even U.S. election laws do not provide a 
set of best practices against which NLRB representation elections can 
be explicitly compared. After the experiences in the 2000 presidential 
election, some, including former President Carter, think a statement of 
democratic principles in U.S. elections is needed (Davis 2001).
Workers’ freedom of association in the United States also comes 
up short when compared against ILO standards for national policies 
protecting this right (Adams 2001; Compa 2000). The main problem 
with using ILO Conventions and Recommendations for making the 
argument that NLRB representation elections in the United States are 
not democratic is that ILO enactments, like U.S. federal laws, do not 
directly address the best practices for conducting democratic elections. 
The dictates of the ILO were drafted to assist all governments of the 
world, the vast majority of which do not use bargaining-unit elections 
as a way for workers to express their choices about whether to join a 
labor union. 
Even if the ILO provided such guidance, it is unlikely that employ-
ers and Congress would accept the ILO’s judgement as constituting the 
appropriate yardstick for measuring labor policies and practices in the 
United States. Potter and Youngman (1995) argue that ILO standards 
reflect a European view. European norms and procedures, they argue, 
do not transfer well to the U.S. context because of differences in con-
stitutions, history, customs, and institutions. Thus, it is not surprising 
that out of 143 Conventions passed by the ILO, the United States has 
ratified only 7, declaring the remainder to be within the jurisdiction of 
the states (Henkin et al. 1999). The U.S. government has, on occasion, 
even threatened to withdraw from the ILO, arguing that 1) there are 
too many nondemocratic members, 2) the ILO is critical of the United 
States and a handful of other states but ignores worse labor laws and 
practices elsewhere, and 3) the ILO has become increasingly politicized 
(Henkin et al. 1999). 
Still others have argued that the low and declining level of union 
density in the United States and the increasing avoidance of NLRB rep-
resentation elections as a way for workers to join unions is evidence of 
unfair NLRB representation election rules (Sweeney 2003). There is 
a substantial literature showing the economic benefits of union mem-
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bership in the United States (see, for example, Buchmueller, DiNardo, 
and Valletta 1999; Fay 1998). Yet, the current unionization rate among 
private sector employees is approximately 9 percent, and 80 percent of 
those who join unions do not join by participating in NLRB representa-
tion elections, they join by accepting a job with a unionized employer 
(Sweeney 2003). Is this low level of union density the result of union 
representation election procedures that are biased against workers who 
wish to join a union? 
To answer this question, one must consider the results of surveys 
showing what workers want. In their now well-known survey of U.S. 
workers, Freeman and Rogers (1999) asked nonunionized workers in 
the private sector, “Would you vote for or against a union in an NLRB 
election at your workplace?” They also asked nonunion workers how 
they thought their colleagues would vote in such an election. Putting 
those numbers together, Freeman and Rogers estimated that one-third 
of nonunionized workers in the private sector wanted a union and be-
lieved that, were an election to be held, workers at their firm would sup-
port a union. According to a national survey by Peter D. Hart Research 
Associates conducted for the AFL-CIO in 2002, half of nonmanage-
ment workers who do not already have a union say they would join a 
union tomorrow if given the chance. This was a full 8 percentage points 
higher than in 2001. Among all workers—including union members—
54 percent said that they would vote for a union tomorrow (Sweeney 
2003). 
There is also some supporting research linking specific bad results 
for the pro-union party to changes in NLRB interpretations of election 
rules (Block and Wolkinson 1985). For example, research demonstrates 
that employers commonly prolong the election campaign phase of the 
process. Based on an analysis of 45,000 NLRB representation elections 
occurring between 1972 and 1978, Roomkin and Block (1981) found 
that the longer the election campaigns, the greater the rate of employer 
victories. They also found that nonparticipation increased with delay, 
suggesting that the campaign itself discouraged participation.
Some argue that surveys and signed authorization cards are use-
less as indicators of demand, because workers lack the information 
necessary to make an informed decision about whether they want to 
be represented by a union, and they can only get that information in an 
election campaign (Greer 2003; Potter and Youngman 1995). By im-
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plication, longer campaigns result in more employer victories, because 
longer campaigns allow voters to receive more information about the 
disadvantages of unions. Moreover, a secret ballot election, they assert, 
is a fundamental device in any democratic system and is the best way 
to allow workers to freely choose whether to join a union (Greer 2003; 
Potter and Youngman 1995).
Critics of the “bad results” arguments claim that they provide an 
unconvincing critique of the fairness of NLRB representation elections. 
After reviewing a wide variety of surveys on worker attitudes toward 
unions, Farber and Krueger (1993) concluded that almost the entire de-
cline in union membership between 1977 and 1991 was due to a decline 
in demand for union representation. This decline in demand for union 
representation has been caused by the steady expansion of federal and 
state laws protecting workers, more enlightened management practices, 
and increased vulnerability of U.S. workers to global competition (Em-
ployment Policy Foundation 1998; Potter and Youngman 1995). Con-
trolling for these and other factors contributing to the declining demand 
for unionization among U.S. workers, studies have shown that manage-
ment opposition has virtually no effect on union density (Employment 
Policy Foundation 1998; Moore and Newman 1988). But these issues 
are essentially irrelevant to the question of eliminating bias from NLRB 
representation election procedures. If, as critics of the “bad results” 
view argue, the demand for union representation has declined, workers 
would continue to vote against union representation even in unbiased 
elections. 
NEW INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
As noted, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that NLRB 
representation election procedures do not even meet recently developed 
minimum international standards for what constitutes a free and fair 
democratic national political election. The new international standards 
were designed to provide an explicit set of best practices for achieving 
free and fair democratic elections in countries with a wide variety of in-
stitutional arrangements and economic endowments. Since they address 
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elections specifically, they can be applied directly to the evaluation of 
the fairness of NLRB representation elections. They are particularly 
useful in this context because it is hard to argue that these standards are 
biased in any way or alien to U.S. culture. 
The new international standards are free of bias because they were 
produced in settings relatively free of the ideologically infused, self-in-
terested, conflict-based politics of the usual debates over proper public 
policy regulating management–labor relations. They are not region-
ally biased either. Whether the particular statement of standards was 
developed in Latin America, Europe, or Africa, the same or at least 
very similar elements are present. They are the kinds of standards for a 
democratic election that might have been produced if experienced and 
informed people came together to set union election rules under what 
political theorist John Rawls (1999) calls the “veil of ignorance.” In the 
union election context, the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical situation 
where those who develop the election procedures must do so before 
they know what roles they will play—employer or worker—once the 
rules have been established. 
Most important, the international standards cannot be criticized as 
alien to U.S. culture, because the U.S. government has been a leader—
perhaps the leader—in the setting of international standards for national 
political elections. In 1976, the Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, an independent U.S. government agency, was created to 
address and assess democratic, economic, and human rights develop-
ments in the 55 countries participating in the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The commission consists of nine 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, nine from the U.S. Sen-
ate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and 
Commerce. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. 
It coordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers 
every year to assess whether elections in the OSCE area are in line with 
international standards for democratic elections and other democratic 
political institutions.1 
Of course, international standards for democratic elections are not 
objective in the sense of being “value free.” They are unabashedly de-
signed to promote democratic practices around the world. Therefore, 
they are useful and impartial for the purpose of evaluating the NLRB 
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representation election process in the United States as long as it is 
agreed that NLRB representation elections should be as democratic as 
possible.
WHY NLRB-SUPERVISED UNION REPRESENTATION 
ELECTIONS ARE NOT FREE
According to international standards for political elections, a “free” 
electoral process is one where fundamental human rights and freedoms 
are respected. The following criteria are necessary for a free, demo-
cratic election:
Freedom from violence, intimidation, or coercion. According to 
the NLRA’s Section 8(a)(3), any discrimination against workers by em-
ployers for concerted activity, including union activity, is prohibited. 
Nonetheless, according to Compa, “Firing a worker for organizing is 
illegal but commonplace in the United States” (2000, p. 18). According 
to Bronfenbrenner (2000), 25 percent of employers illegally fire at least 
one worker for union activity during organizing campaigns, and 52 per-
cent of employers threaten to call the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service during organizing drives that include undocumented employ-
ees. After studying 407 union representation campaigns in 1998 and 
1999, Bronfenbrenner found that, in 51 percent of the campaigns, em-
ployers threatened to close or move if the pro-union party won. Thus, it 
is no surprise that workers in a nonunionized, private sector workplace 
are usually afraid to openly support the pro-union party. Intimidation of 
members of the pro-union party is illegal, but the law is not vigorously 
enforced. 
Freedom of speech and expression by voters, parties, candi-
dates, and the media. Unfortunately, limiting workers’ free speech 
rights in the workplace is both common and legal. During many, if not 
most, union election campaigns, workers are subjected to mandatory 
captive audience meetings and mandatory one-on-one meetings with 
supervisors in their workplaces (Bronfenbrenner 2000). These mea-
sures are allowed under Section 8(c) of the NLRA, the 1947 “employer 
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free speech” clause. Bronfenbrenner (2000) also found that 78 percent 
of employers force employees to attend one-on-one antiunion meetings 
with managers and 92 percent force their employees to attend manda-
tory antiunion presentations. In contrast, workers can be and usually are 
prohibited from engaging in pro-union speech in the workplace during 
work times (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). 
Freedom of assembly to hold political rallies and to campaign. 
Technically, workers have this right but have difficulties exercising it 
because it is illegal for pro-union workers to assemble on company 
property, even during nonworking hours, without the permission of the 
employer. Workers who favor forming unions are limited to contact-
ing their colleagues outside the workplace or during breaks and lunch 
periods (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). Many low-wage workers, 
who need union representation the most, do not own a car, so attending 
meetings in a location different from the workplace may be difficult 
(Ehrenreich 2001). There are no similar obstacles to freedom of as-
sembly by the employer, because the employer may use work time to 
present its message.
Freedom of access to and by voters to transmit and receive 
political and electoral information messages. While workers are al-
lowed to receive information from union advocates in nonwork areas 
and on nonwork time within the workplace (Block, Beck, and Kruger 
1996), the worker access of pro-union workers is far less than that of 
the employer, who controls the workers’ work day and who can use that 
control to deliver its antiunion message. Moreover, the union may not 
enter the employer’s property unless the workers live on the property 
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). 
Freedom to question, challenge, and register complaints or ob-
jections without negative repercussions. This freedom is crucial to 
ensuring respect for all the other freedoms. Individuals do not really 
have any right unless it is recognized in law, and there is an effective, 
speedy, legal remedy for those who feel that the right guaranteed to them 
under law has not been respected. The labor relations law does allow for 
legal avenues of appeal by workers who feel that their rights were not 
respected during an NLRB union representation election. However, the 
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long delays in the U.S. labor law system, coupled with weak penalties 
for employers who eventually are found guilty of an infraction, make 
the exercise of this right fruitless. If a terminated worker appeals to the 
NLRB for help, the appeal usually takes years, and the potential reward 
for the persistent worker is small (reinstatement with back pay). For 
many employers, this penalty is a small price to pay to destroy a work-
ers’ organizing effort by firing its leaders (Compa 2000, p. 18). 
WHY NLRB-SUPERVISED UNION REPRESENTATION 
ELECTIONS ARE NOT FAIR
According to international standards for political elections, a “fair” 
electoral process is one where the playing field is reasonably level and 
accessible to all voters, parties, and candidates. Therefore, the follow-
ing criteria are required in a fair democratic election:
Clearly defined universal suffrage. The question of who should 
vote in a union election is often a matter of dispute. The NLRB deter-
mines which workers make up the bargaining unit and which do not. 
Employers work hard to influence this part of the process, often claim-
ing that pro-union groups of workers should not be included in the vote. 
Although unions also try to influence the definition of the bargaining 
unit too, perhaps the biggest impact of the dispute of the definition of 
the bargaining unit is delay. Delay prolongs the election campaign, 
which, in turn, helps the employer because of the employer’s access 
advantages (Block and Wolkinson 1986; Roomkin and Block 1981).
Equitable access to financial and material resources for party 
and candidate campaigning. In the union representation election con-
text, there is rarely “equitable access to financial and material resourc-
es” by the pro-union and antiunion parties. The employer almost always 
has an overwhelming resource advantage. Logan (2002) estimates that 
during 75 percent of union representation campaigns, employers hire 
high-priced, experienced, professional, antiunion consultants to help 
them conduct their antiunion campaign. The pro-union “party” is al-
most always financially overmatched. 
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Equitable opportunities for the electorate (workers) to receive 
election-relevant information. Becker (1998) argues that the abilities 
of the pro-union and antiunion parties to communicate with workers 
are so unequal that many “workers vote against representation because 
they have never heard the union’s arguments” (p. 101). As noted, the 
substantial workplace-access advantage of the employer makes it im-
possible for the workers to receive as much information from the union 
as from the employer. 
Equitable treatment of voters (workers), candidates, and par-
ties, by elections officials (the NLRB), the government, the police, 
the military, and the judiciary. While the most important reason for 
the inability of workers to exercise their freedom of association at the 
workplace has been determined opposition by employers, government 
agencies have played their part too. Gross (1999) writes the following 
about government support for freedom of association rights, particularly 
over the past 30 years: “The White House, no matter who the occupant, 
has either been hostile or non-committal; Congress has also been hos-
tile, finding it more politically profitable to run against the NLRA than 
to be for it; the courts, including the Supreme Court, have issued deci-
sions freeing employers from the constraints of the law” (p. 80). Thus, 
although there is no evidence that the NLRB staff that administers elec-
tions are biased against workers, it is clear that there is little support at 
higher levels of government for workers’ rights to unionize.
CONCLUSION
As this chapter shows, the procedures under which NLRB represen-
tation elections are conducted violate international standards for free 
and fair elections. Our conclusion concerning the undemocratic nature 
of NLRB representation elections supports most previous research on 
the subject. It contributes to previous research findings because it is 
based on a different, arguably neutral, and more explicit standard for 
what elements should be present in a democratic election. The law 
should be changed to make it easier for workers to exercise their right 
to freedom of association at the workplace. Workers should have the 
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freedom to make their own choices about joining a union without in-
terference from management. While a free and fair election campaign 
can provide useful information to voters, NLRB representation election 
campaigns are not free or fair. The election procedures and remedies 
permit employers to intimidate voters, thereby frustrating the desire of 
workers at many workplaces to join a union and to have a collective 
voice at work. 
In all societies, employers inherently have more power than unor-
ganized workers because unorganized workers are dependent on the 
employer for their livelihoods. If the U.S. federal courts and the NLRB 
had wanted to level the playing field, they would have developed union 
representation election procedures that gave more weight to the im-
portance of workers’ freedom of speech, freedom of association, and 
right to collective bargaining than they did to employers’ property and 
free speech rights. Because the courts and NLRB took a different path, 
too many biased preelection and postelection practices have accumu-
lated and have become entrenched in U.S. labor law. Compa (2000) 
contends that the broken election procedures can be fixed by tinkering 
with the existing rules. Unfortunately, it would take decades, perhaps 
generations, to undo the harm that has been done. Union representation 
election procedures, therefore, for all practical purposes, are beyond 
repair. 
Note
 1.  The benchmark standards used in this paper are based on international standards 
for free and fair elections that have been developed and promulgated by gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations. See, especially, OSCE (1990, 
2003), and Inter-Parliamentary Union (1994). International nongovernmental 
organizations have promulgated similar principles, such as the guidelines de-
veloped by the International Foundation for Election Systems (http://www 
.ifes.org); Common Borders (http://www.commonborders.org); and the Admin-
istration and Cost of Elections Project (http://www.aceproject.org). Information 
about election standards also can be found on the Web sites of the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at http://www.idea.int; and the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs at http://www.ndi.org.
54   Cingranelli
References
Adams, Roy J. 2001. “Choice or Voice: Rethinking American Labor Policy in 
Light of the International Human Rights Consensus.” Employee Rights and 
Employment Policy Journal 5(2): 521–547.
Becker, Craig. 1998. “Elections Without Democracy: Reconstructing the Right 
to Organize.” New Labor Forum Fall/Winter: 97–109.
Block, Richard N., John Beck, and Daniel H. Kruger. 1996. Labor Law, In-
dustrial Relations and Employee Choice: The State of the Workplace in the 
1990s. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Block, Richard N., and Benjamin W. Wolkinson. 1985. “Delay in the Union 
Election Campaign Revisted: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” In 
Advances in Industrial Relations. Vol. 3, David B. Lipsky and David Lewin, 
eds. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 31–70.
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 1998. “Employer Behavior in Certification Elections 
and First Contracts: Implications for Labor Law Reform.” In Restoring the 
Promise of American Labor Law, Sheldon Friedman, Richard Hurd, Rudy 
Oswald, and Ronald Seeber, eds. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, pp. 75–89.
———. 2000. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, 
Wages and Union Organizing. Report submitted to the U.S. Trade Deficit 
Review Commission, September 6.
Buchmueller, Thomas C., John DiNardo, and Robert G. Valletta. 1999. “Union 
Effects on Health Insurance Provision and Coverage in the United States.” 
Working paper. San Francisco: San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank. 
Compa, Lance. 2000. Unfair Advantage. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Davis, Jingle. 2001. “U.S. Voting Standards Fall Far Short, Carter Says. Non-
partisan Panel Opens Hearings on Ways to Improve Accuracy and Fair-
ness.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, March 27, A:3.
Ehrenreich, Barbara. 2001. Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in Ameri-
ca. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Employment Policy Foundation. 1998. “Fact and Fallacy: Updating Reasons 
for Union Decline.” http://www.epf.org/pubs/newsletters/1998/ff4%2Df.asp 
(accessed April 24, 2005).
Farber, Henry S., and Alan B. Krueger. 1993. “Union Membership in the United 
States: The Decline Continues.” In Employee Representation: Alternatives 
and Future Directions, Bruce Kaufman and Morris Kleiner, eds. Madison, 
WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 70–79.
Fay, Hansen. 1998. “Union Membership and Union Wage Differential.” Com-
pensation and Benefits Review 30(3):16–23.
Freeman, Richard B., and Joel Rogers. 1999. What Workers Want. Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press.
International Elections Standards and NLRB Elections   55
Greer, Stan. 2003. “Big Labor’s Cockamamie Campaign against Secret-Ballot 
Elections for Workers.” Springfield, VA: National Institute for Labor Re-
lations Research. http://www.nilrr.org/Big%20Labors%20Cockamamie% 
20Campaign.pdf (accessed April 24, 2005).
Gross, James A. 1999. “A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor 
Relations Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association.” Em-
ployee Rights and Employment Policy Journal 3(3): 65–104.
Henkin, Louis, Gerald L. Neuman, Diane F. Orentlicher, and David W. Le-
ebron. 1999. Human Rights. New York: Foundation Press.
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2003. International Labour Stan-
dards. Geneva: ILO.
 ———. n.d. “Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” http://www.ilo.
org/dyn/declaris/declarationweb.indexpage (accessed April 24, 2005).
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1994. “Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elec-
tions.” http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm (accessed April 24, 2005).
Levin, Andrew. 2001. “What Thirty Million Workers Want—But Can’t Have.” 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 3(3): 
551–561.
Logan, John. 2002. “Consultants, Lawyers and the ‘Union Free’ Movement in 
the U.S.A, 1970–2000.” Industrial Relations Journal 33(3): 197–214.
Moore, William J., and Robert J. Newman. 1988. “A Cross-Section Analysis 
of the Decline in American Trade Union Membership.” Journal of Labor 
Research 9(2): 111–125.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 1990. “Inter-
national Standards of Elections.” Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of 
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, June 29. http://www 
.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/1704_en.html?PHPSESSID=d0a43b9
6bae871253a5fb68e4de076ee (accessed April 28, 2005).
———. 2003. “Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE 
Participating States,” http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/10/772_e
n.pdf?PHPSESSID=d0a43b96bae871253a5fb68e4de076ee (accessed April 
28, 2005).
Potter, Edward E., and Judith A. Youngman. 1995. Keeping America Competi-
tive. Lakewood, CO: Glenbridge Publishing Ltd.
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.
Roomkin, Myron, and Richard N. Block. 1981. “Case Processing Time and the 
Outcomes of Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence.” Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review 1: 75–94.
Sweeney, John J. 2003. Remarks at the American Political Science Association 
annual meeting, held in Philadelphia, August 30.
56   Cingranelli
United Nations. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” http://www 
.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed April 28, 2005).
———. 1966. “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (accessed April 
28, 2005).
Weiler, Paul C. 1997. “Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Schol-
ars.” University of Chicago Law Review 58(Summer): 1015–1025.
Justice on the Job 
Perspectives on the Erosion 
of Collective Bargaining 







W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Blocketal.indb   3 3/2/2006   8:59:54 AM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Justice on the job : perspectives on the erosion of collective bargaining in the United 
States / Richard N. Block . . . [et al.].
 p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-278-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0 88099-278-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-279-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-88099-279-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Collective bargaining—United States. 2. Labor unions—United States. 3. Job 
security—United States. 4. Employee rights—United States. 5. Industrial relations—





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the author. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Blocketal.indb   4 3/2/2006   8:59:54 AM
